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Abstract: The multisensory regions in frontoparietal cortices play a crucial role in the sense of
body and self. Disrupting this sense may lead to a feeling of disembodiment, or more generally,
a sense of disownership. Experimentally, this altered consciousness disappears during illusory
own-body perceptions, increasing the intensity of perceived ownership for an external virtual limb.
In many clinical conditions, particularly in individuals with a discontinuous or absent sense of bodily
awareness, the brain may effortlessly create a convincing feeling of body ownership over a surrogate
body or body part. The immediate visual input dominates the current bodily state and induces rapid
plastic adaptation that reconfigures the dynamics of bodily representation, allowing the brain to
acquire an alternative sense of body and self. Investigating strategies to deconstruct the lack of a
normal sense of bodily ownership, especially after a neurological injury, may aid the selection of
appropriate clinical treatment.
Keywords: disownership; ownership; tumor resection; disembodiment; parietal cortex; spinal cord
injury; rubber hand illusion; neuroplasticity; body representation
1. Introduction
A normal awareness of one’s own body and body parts is essential for perception–motor
interactions and is fundamentally critical for cognition. Patients with right frontal-parietal brain
lesions sometimes disown their left limb [1]. After experiencing a spinal cord injury (SCI), patients
may question the completeness of and sense of ownership over their own body [2]. After a right
temporal-parietal cortex tumor resection, a patient experienced a sense of complete disownership of
their entire physical body [3]. People with such neurological conditions grapple with an unclear sense
of “mineness” pertaining to their own bodies.
The feeling of body ownership—the sense of fundamentally possessing one’s body and self—is
presumably the product of a complex system of multisensory awareness that effortlessly creates a
unified, coherent experience of one’s self and body, including real-time updates [4]. Ownership of
actual body parts or the body as a whole can be dissociated after brain and spinal cord damage [1,5] as
well as during experimental manipulations of self-attribution by using a virtual body and multisensory
conflict [6]. Frontoparietal and insular cortices integrate multisensory perceptions that generate the
feeling of body ownership [7–10]. Injury, malfunction, or altered neural information from and toward
these cortices may generate errors in self-attribution. Modification of self-attribution can also be easily
induced in healthy research subjects, as in the “rubber hand illusion” (RHI), a renowned experimental
paradigm that alters the congruity of multisensory information and manipulates the sense of body
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ownership [6]. An illusory ownership could be induced by experimentally generating conflict during
the integration of multisensory bodily information. Through temporal congruency of vision, touch and
proprioception, it is possible to feel artificial body parts or an entire virtual body as one’s own body.
During this experimental procedure, synchronous (but not asynchronous) touching of a visible rubber
hand and the real hand, which is hidden from view, induces a temporary feeling of ownership over a
fake hand. This attribution is typically measured by objective (the perceived position of the real hand
toward the rubber hand) and subjective (the experience of owning the rubber hand) indices. While
some participants report subjective experiences such as the disappearance of their real hand, a sense of
loss of its position and that it is no longer part of their own bodies, others indicate that this loss appears
to be relatively rare, or at least very weak during RHI [11–14]. The complex neurobiological model
underlying this sense of body ownership has been systematically investigated in neurologically intact
individuals; however, studies in patients with neurological lesions can shed considerable light on how
the sense of body ownership is generated. Here, we focus on the problem of body ownership from the
clinical perspective, focusing on perceptual and neural similarities in selected neurological conditions
where loss of ownership has been experimentally investigated through multisensory impressions and
integration. In particular, we will discuss how loss of disownership can be experimentally achieved by
using the RHI [6]. We suggest that multisensory stimulation may aid the development of appropriate
clinical treatment in neurologic patients with altered sensory information and/or a disruption of body
ownership perception.
2. Multisensory Network Codes for Body Ownership
Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the sense of bodily self-consciousness involves a
multisensory integration of input that is realigned and integrated in a unique body-centered reference
frame in the frontoparietal and temporal-parietal regions [4,15]. In particular, the parietal lobe in the
right hemisphere is central to the representation of various parameters of bodily knowledge [16]. Right
temporal-parietal lesions induce selective deficits in the representation of spatial relationships between
various body parts and the whole body [17] as well as in the structural/topological knowledge of
body unity [18,19]. An illusory, visual localization of the self into extrapersonal space (an out-of-body
experience) has been reported in patients with right temporal-parietal damage [20]. However, dynamic
changes in generating and updating the feeling of limb ownership are centered in frontoparietal regions,
including the frontal premotor structures [21]. Therefore, inferior frontal lesions lead to disorders of
body awareness and movement representations. Patients who exhibit disownership show additional
damage in subcortical structures: thalamus, basal ganglia, and the surrounding white matter [22].
Hemodynamic markers of brain activity are related to feelings of body ownership during RHI in
healthy individuals, further confirming that the illusion of body ownership depends on multisensory
spatial and temporal congruence in the premotor cortices and along the intraparietal sulcus and inferior
parietal cortex [23–25]. Frontoparietal areas, which are strongly interconnected, reflect changes in
self-identification and self-location toward the position of the virtual body [4]. Neuroimaging studies
have also suggested that vestibular representation in the right posterior insula is critical for integrating
the body position in space and for maintaining the sense of ownership that follows illusion [26].
Of note, other cortical areas, such as the extrastriate body area, have been implicated in the distinction
between the visual, proprioceptive, and tactile information involved in the experience of owning a
limb [8]. Recent studies demonstrate that such bizarre experiences result from an altered functional
connectivity among these body-related cortical regions and the basal ganglia or cerebellum, indicating
that even subcortical pathways support the optimization of the crossmodal prediction of temporal and
spatial signals, contributing to the cortical multisensory processing that forms a coherent, higher-level
representation of the body [4].
Experiences of body ownership misperception appear to be related to an altered multisensory
convergence of neural signals in the fronto-temporal-parietal cortex, where signals are significantly
modulated by corticospinal projections. This observation indicates that reducing this network’s activity
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after a tumor resection or stroke may impact bodily self-consciousness [27]. In view of this information,
we expected that even reduced peripheral inputs, which alter and diminish one’s somatic and motor
control of their real hand, would influence the perception of body ownership. Indeed, in cases with
SCI or brachial avulsion, in the absence of cerebral lesion, alterations of efferent (motor) and afferent
(sensory) information, resulting in major changes in multisensory integration, can impact the capacity
to acquire a sense of ownership over a surrogate body [28,29]. Indeed, a deafferented/deefferented part
of the body reduces proprioceptive tactile and motor control to correctly “locate” the true hand.
3. Illusory Ownership Alters Self-Embodiment in Neurological Patients
In neurological patients, a disrupted sense of body and self, sense of disownership [30],
and delusions of various body parts [31] can be the consequences of a failure to realign continuous
and coherent visual, tactile, proprioceptive, vestibular, and interoceptive signals that converge at the
fronto-temporal-parietal and insular structures [32,33].
Recently, Smit and colleagues [3] reported an unusual case of a man who, after undergoing a
right temporal-parietal cortex tumor resection, developed a lack of ownership over his entire body
despite possessing intact somatosensory perception. To restore a sense of corporeal self-ownership
in the patient, the researchers focused on two key, intriguing questions underlying this ownership.
First, they assessed whether rapid and pronounced changes to illusory ownership of the patient’s
body could be induced experimentally using RHI, which has been interpreted as implicit evidence for
creating a successful surrogate embodiment [34,35]. Second, they investigated the interplay between
incoming sensory signals from the brain, which alter the state of disembodiment.
Applying a synchronous tactile stimulation to the left hand of the patient and to a rubber hand
increased the patient’s sense of ownership over the rubber hand, as reflected by both outcome measures:
an (objective) proprioception and (subjective) embodiment questionnaire. Not only was the illusion
of body ownership induced, but when the patient looked at the rubber hand without receiving any
tactile stimulation to the real hand, there was no difference between synchronous stroking and visual
input for both measures, indicating that the subjective and objective judgments relative to illusion were
essentially based on vision. Thus, evoked illusory ownership reveals that RHI is a powerful tool used
to alter and capture the patient’s sense of body ownership. The patient’s heightened susceptibility
to obtaining ownership over a virtual hand, despite actually sensing complete disownership of his
entire body, is a result that may appear paradoxical. In this respect, previous studies in patients with
brain damage have unraveled a sense of body and self that is more intense for the body parts that
are inaccessible to awareness [21,32,36,37]. In the case of disownership, visual cues from a realistic
body part can be sufficient to generate an illusory sense of ownership of the rubber hand in patients
with a right frontoparietal lesion [1]. Even for patients with SCI and peripheral alteration of bodily
signaling due to physical loss, the effect of the RHI (measured subjectively through questionnaires and
objectively by the mislocalization of the sense of position between the actual and artificial body) was
more evident in those patients who had greater loss of somatosensory sensation than in patients with
intact perception [5]. Together, this indicates that neurological patients with a sense of disownership
appear to be overwriting the disownership of their biological hand with visual location information
from the rubber hand [38]. As observed in patients with specific neurological conditions [28,39–42],
the brain may be more prone to incorporating artificial surrogates such as a realistic prosthetic hand
into the representation of the individual’s own body [43] when the person’s normal sense of body is
weak or absent.
Furthermore, the extent to which there is a decrease in the reliability of ownership cues for one’s
real hand increases proportionately with the subjective strength of the illusion, as indicated by the
physiological measure of the RHI [41,42]. It has been surmised that healthy participants’ illusions
of body ownership are experienced in tandem with the disownership of their real hand. Therefore,
healthy participants never report the sensation of having three arms during RHI [12]. If the illusion
is evoked, the rubber hand and the actual hand become unified, suggesting that if there is a sense
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of disownership of the intact, actual hand, the fake representation is experienced as the “replaced”
hand [11,12]. In terms of physiological reactions, decreased ownership of the real hand can lead to
reduced corticospinal excitability [44,45], increases in pain thresholds [46], histamine reactivity [47],
slower tactile processing [48], and decreases in temperature [48] recorded in the real hand. Recognizing
a body as belonging to oneself certainly plays a role in ascribing the weight of conflicting sensations,
derived from the rubber hand, to the real hand, and one must subjectively resolve the initial conflict [11].
However, disownership of one’s own hand is not a prerequisite in RHI, and all the physiological
changes to the real hand are highly questioned and debated in the literature [13,49,50].
4. The Multisensory Integration of Bodily Signals is Constrained by Somatic Perception
Disruption or instability in the bodily self seems to affect multisensory processes involving the
affected limb, which suggests a strong influence of sensorimotor information over the longer term,
experiential body representation. Cases of disownership after a stroke in the frontoparietal area
display a robust visual capture of an illusionary ownership of the rubber hand without brushstrokes
or other tactile stimulation [1,36]. Atypical susceptibility to the RHI, however, has been reported in
Parkinson’s disease, in which patients experience more proprioceptive drift than the healthy controls
under synchronous (illusion-inducing) as well as in asynchronous conditions (control), probably due to
primary proprioceptive impairments [51]. Visual–tactile application of the RHI in individuals with SCI
seems to elicit the reemergence of illusionary ownership when somatic sensation from the periphery
is residual. These observations indicate that patients benefit more from vision “overruling” [52] and
visual capture [53] to overcome the absence of somatic inputs than from the interplay of conflicting
multisensory information. As hypothesized in other studies, many neurological patients may rely more
on visual capture and less on proprioceptive and tactile cues than healthy subjects do because of the
difficulty localizing the biological hand’s position using normal sensation [51,54]. Absent, attenuated,
or incongruent somatosensory precision may increase a person’s capacity to “lose” their own hand
and engender spatial remapping on the rubber hand as their own.
Despite a significant number of studies on the impact of somatic information on normal
multisensory integration of bodily signals, the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying the
visual capture of proprioception and its relation to a misperception of body ownership remain unclear.
This includes the pertinent question of whether visual effects are limited to modulations of surrogate
ownership or whether they extend to stronger, generative effects that evoke body perceptions. Smit
and colleagues [3] reported a patient who displayed a pronounced sense of illusion after a right
temporal-parietal cortex tumor resection, with visual exposure to the rubber hand without tactile
manipulation. In this case, the heightened susceptibility to a body-ownership illusion cannot be
explained by the altered processing of multisensory integration alone [3]. Despite a sense of complete
disownership, the patient was reported to have intact somatosensory perception, motor planning,
and execution [3].
Thus, while the benefit of vision is understandable in amputees where the biological segment
is absent, the value of vision is less obvious when the biological body part is still anatomically and
functionally present. The patient who “lost” his body after a tumor resection did so when his vision
of his body was blocked, as is the case during the RHI. From the perspective of the brain, physical
disembodiment and amputation [55] could be treated as similar when using the RHI paradigm: in both
cases, given the inability to record the visual experience of one’s own physical body, alternative
ownership has no effect on the natural experience of embodying one’s real body.
Accordingly, it is important to note that disownership effects can be generated along a continuum
of variables. One way could be by decrementing the weight of the senses coming from the body
(such as touch and proprioception in SCI and Parkinson disease); another way would be to experience
a complete detachment from the physical body (such as when the patient “lost” his body or after
frontoparietal lesions). In both of these cases, they could not feel or control their actual body. Under
certain circumstances of visuo-tactile integration, patients may temporarily rely on a more visually
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based image of their body rather than on their somatosensation. This raises the possibility that the
virtual body does not produce any multisensory conflicts or implicit violations of the expectations and
representations which describe what one knows one’s body is truly like, facilitating the perceptual
flexibility needed for the body ownership illusion [56]. However, evidence for the specific cognitive
mechanisms underlying visual capture as it relates to the body ownership illusion is still lacking.
An understanding of the numerous bodily signals in the brain is required to determine how the cerebral
organization of the interconnected cortical areas, subcortical areas, and corticospinal projections
contribute to the identification of corporeal awareness. In cases where neurological damage has
disturbed the multisensory integration in the cortical and subcortical body areas, reducing the conflict
between the visual, tactile, and proprioceptive inputs in the body, visual cues from a realistic body
part can be sufficient for not only recalibrating the hand’s position, but also for generating feelings
of ownership of the fake hand [1]. Even in healthy subjects, an attenuation of responses in the
somatosensory cortex may be useful to resolve perceptual ambiguity about perceived ownership of the
body [57,58]. Tentatively, we suggest that under clinical conditions, such an enhanced response to the
RHI may be pivotal to altering the sense of body ownership, mediated by an increased dependence
on visual cues and less on proprioceptive and tactile controls or body memory. Taken together, these
neurological studies suggest that the visual capture effect may be due to a temporary disruption of
any conscious and unconscious information (the weighting and integration of proprioceptive, tactile,
interoceptive signals) or damaged top-down mechanisms (e.g., instability of the bodily self or altered
signals in the frontoparietal cortex) of the participants’ body representation. The vision effect may
further reduce the relative weight of somatosensory stimuli, leading to augmented subjective feelings
of ownership for the rubber hand.
This neurological picture may help to reconcile the discrepancy between alternative models of
body ownership that are not based on multisensory integration, [29] models in which multisensory
interactions act at the initial stage to resolve conflicting perceptions in probabilistic representation and
self-awareness based on predictive coding signals about the body.
5. Conclusions
In this analysis, we discussed the recent evidence on rapid experimental changes in body
perception that occur under conditions of a weak or an absent sense of body ownership, pursuing
their implications in unraveling the mechanisms underlying bodily perception. A close scrutiny of
clinical populations during experimental manipulation of bodily illusions may further elucidate the
existing knowledge on the sense of disownership of one’s own body. It is easier to capture the sense
of ownership over a virtual body under the condition of disownership of oneself. The virtual body
may be possessed more easily because ownership of the rubber hand obviates the need to mask
one’s ownership of the real hand. For the phenomenon of altering self-perception and the sense of
embodying one’s own body, the temporal and spatial congruency rule is not critical for determining
the multisensory perception. Vision seems predominant in triggering the prediction, weighting,
and elicitation of ownership sensations in RHI.
An empirically tractable and predictable model to understand bodily disownership has important
implications for clinical and rehabilitative approaches to physical impairment and to improving the
scientific understanding of the sense of “my body” in one’s mind. This finding suggests that when
conceptualizing the patient’s condition, any level of physical disembodiment should be considered
as not only a deficit but also a modification of both brain plasticity and the ability to embody a
surrogate body part (for example, a rubber hand). Under certain clinical conditions, a realistic artificial
hand could be an assistive tool or a surrogate for developing new rehabilitative strategies and for
translational research [59–61].
Despite the lack of clarity about the mechanisms underlying illusory body ownership, recent
studies have suggested that RHI has beneficial effects on attenuating pain [42,62] as well as possible
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residual somatic sensations [41]. Patients with neurological disorders may derive therapeutic benefits
from coherent sensory stimulations of a virtual body that they perceive as their own.
Technological advancements in virtual-reality-based paradigms have also received significant
clinical interest and are quickly being developed to offer solutions for restoring the subjective
awareness, somatic illusion, and feelings of embodiment that are required to maintain a functional
physical body [63,64].
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